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Abstract 
 
Tracing is generally understood to be the process of following value from one right to 
its exchange product. It is for the claimant to show either that there has been  a ‘direct 
substitution’, or a string of such substitutions evidencing an unbroken chain of value; 
if able to do so, it is thought that he can ‘transmit’ his claim from the right substituted 
to its product. This burden has, however, been made increasingly difficult to 
discharge by the development of complex payment mechanisms involving multiple 
payment instructions and interceding periods of indebtedness.   
This article argues that concepts of value are conceptually and practically 
misleading. Identifying and determining the content of transactions are normative 
processes that depend, not upon identifying the precise mechanisms by which a  
particular change in legal relations is sought and executed, but rather upon the 
manifested intentions of the transacting parties. This allows us to deal 
straightforwardly with complex payment structures, clearing and credit, and to focus 
instead upon the role of transactions in the justification for a resulting claim.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A simple idea unites contemporary tracing theory across the common law world: 
when we trace we follow a continuous thread – value – from one right to another, 
A 
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which we do by identifying one or more ‘transactional links’.1 Tracing’s ‘central case’ 
is thus a straightforward one: if T, who holds title to a £10 note on trust for B, buys 
with it a bottle of wine, value moves from title to the note to title to the wine, so that 
any claims B had to the former are transmitted to the latter.   
This insistence that there is some directness, a continuous thread that, because 
it is ‘in the very nature of things’,2 can be established independently of intention, has, 
however, made it increasingly difficult to apply principles of tracing to modern 
payment mechanisms; a party who wishes to trace through multiple intermediate 
accounts is typically required to evidence a series of ‘direct’ substitutions, linking 
debits to credits in an unbroken chain,3 and judges have often, but not invariably, 
concluded that the process is automatically thwarted if money is paid into an 
                                                          
* Tatiana Cutts is a Lecturer in Law at the University of Birmingham. I am very grateful, with the 
ordinary disclaimer, to Jamie Glister, James Lee, Charles Mitchell, Duncan Sheehan, Lionel Smith, 
Rob Stevens and Fred Wilmot Smith for comments on earlier drafts, and to participants at the 
Obligations VII Conference for comments on the version presented in July 2014 at the University of 
Hong Kong.  
 
1 See e.g. Kwai Hung Realty Co Ltd v Yip Fung Sheung [1997] HKEC 683; Foskett v McKeown [2001] 
1 AC 102; Waxman v Waxman [2002] CarswellOnt 3047, [2002] OTC 443; Grant v St. Marie 2005 
CarswellAlta 71, 2005 ABQB 35, [2005] AWLD 1355; Hillig v Darkinjung Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 
1217 Pacific Electric Wire & Cable Co Ltd v Texan Management Ltd [2008] 4 HKLRD 349; CY 
Foundation Group v Cheng Chee Tock [2012] 1 HKLRD 532; Eaton v LDC Finance Limited [2012] 
NZHC 1105; Wee Chiaw Sek Anna v Ng Li-Ann Genevieve [2013] SGCA 36. 
2 C. Hare, ‘Tracing Value and the Value of Tracing’ (2013) 24 JBFLP 249, 266. 
3 Relfo v Varsani [2014] EWCA Civ 360. 
 3 
overdrawn bank account,4 or clearing system.5 The exercise is thus inextricably bound 
up with the particular manner in which a payment is executed, a variable that is 
almost always entirely outwith the claimant’s control. 
In this article I argue that the idea of ‘tracing value’ is both conceptually and 
practically misleading. The content of a transaction cannot be determined without 
reference to the intention of the parties, deduced from the agreement as a whole. If 
this process reveals that the parties intended several steps to work together, the 
transaction is to be characterised accordingly. This allows us to ignore the 
interposition of intermediate payment instructions, clearing and credit, and to focus 
instead upon the role of transactions in the claims that result from their proof.   
The purpose of this article is not, therefore, to provide a positive account for 
which our monolithic law of tracing can simply be substituted, but rather to 
demonstrate that those problems which have occupied centre stage in tracing 
discourse are illusory, and to direct attention instead to the issues that arise once value 
metaphors are removed. In so doing, it becomes manifest that there are important 
differences between the various fact-patterns currently described by reference to 
principles of tracing. Rather than attempting to follow the path of value from one 
asset to another, we are instead faced with the task of determining the normative role 
                                                          
4 Conlan v Connolly [2011] WASC 160; CY Foundation Group v Cheng Chee Tock n 1 above; Rea v 
Russell [2012] NZCA 536. 
5 Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1991] Ch 547; El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings [1993] 3 All ER 717; 
Nimmo v Westpac Banking Corp [1993] 3 NZLR 218; Bank Tejarat v Hong Kong and Shanghai 
Banking Corp (CI) Ltd [1995] 1 Lloyds Rep 239; Citadel General Assurance Co v Lloyds Bank 
Canada [1997] 3 SCR 805; Equiticorp Industries Group Ltd v The Crown (No 47) [1998] 2 NZLR 
481; Bank of America v Arnell [1999] Lloyd's Rep Bank 399; London Allied Holdings v Lee [2007] 
EWHC 2061; BMP Global Distribution Inc v Bank of Nova Scotia [2009] 1 SCR 504. 
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of: a transaction entered into by an agent without the consent of his principal;6 a 
transaction entered into by a trustee or other fiduciary without the capacity to change 
the claimant’s position with respect to some third party;7 a transaction executed by a 
non-fiduciary wrongdoer,8 and a transaction entered into by an innocent party, with 
whom the claimant had no prior relationship.9 The purpose of this article is to equip 
us to see and start that task. 
TRACING 
 
 
The kind of fact pattern that typically frames an academic analysis of tracing is as 
follows: 
 
Example (i): T holds title to a £10 note on trust for B. T uses that note 
to purchase a bottle of wine. He does not have B’s authority to do so. 
 
 
In such a case B is said to be able to follow the path of value from T’s title to the note 
to T’s title to the bottle of wine, and, accordingly, may assert a claim the latter. In the 
leading text on the subject Smith explains: 
Consider the simplest case in which the plaintiff’s asset is exchanged 
by the defendant for some other asset, and the plaintiff wants to trace 
into the new asset. The only connection which the plaintiff has to the 
new asset is that it was acquired with the old asset. The defendant 
acquired the value inherent in the new asset with the value inherent in 
the old asset. That is why we say we trace value: it is the only constant 
that exists before, though and after the substitutions through which we 
trace. It exists in a different form after the substitution, and that is 
what can justify a claim to the new asset.10 
 
                                                          
6 e.g. Relfo v Varsani [2014] EWCA Civ 360. 
 
7 e.g. Taylor v Plumer (1816) 3 M & S 562, 105 ER 721; Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102; 
Independent Trustee Services v GP Noble Trustees [2012] EWCA Civ 195. 
 
8 e.g. Banque Belge pour l'Etranger v Hambrouck [1921] 1 KB 321; Shalson v Russo [2005] Ch 281. 
 
9 e.g. Jones v Trustee of FC Jones & Sons [1997] Ch 159. 
 
10 L. D. Smith, The Law of Tracing (OUP, 1997) 119. 
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Adopting in its entirety the logic of value transfers, courts have preserved a ‘tight 
focus on asset exchanges’,11 insisting upon the identification of a chain of 
substitutions through which a continuous flow of value can be pursued.12  
However, few of our tracing cases – almost all of which involve bank transfers 
– are encapsulated as readily as Example (i) by the terminology of asset exchanges: 
 
Example (ii): T holds a bank account on trust for B. He transfers 
£1000 from the trust account to C’s account. 
 
 
In Relfo v Varsani Arden LJ considered that, ‘when funds are transmitted through the 
banking system, what matters is that there has been an exchange of the value of the 
claimant’s property into the next product for which it is substituted and so on down 
the chain of substitutions’.13 ‘Exchange… into’ is revealing. In Example (ii) B cannot 
follow the original trust right: when a bank transfer is made the transferee does not 
acquire the right that the transferor gave up.14 There is nothing to follow but a ‘stream 
of electrons’.15 But nor is there any ‘exchange’, if that term is understood narrowly to 
refer to the process of a single actor giving up one right in return for another: at most, 
the changes in B and C’s positions that result from the payment instruction occur as 
part of the same legal event. The process of following the path of value through bank 
transfers is thus more naturally and more often described as a process of identifying 
one or more ‘transactional links’: 
                                                          
11 C. Mitchell, P. Mitchell and S. Watterson (eds), Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment (8th 
edn, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) 1176. 
12 OJSC OIL Co Yugraneft v Abramovich [2008] EWHC 2613 
13 Relfo v Varsani, n 3 above, at [60]. 
14 R v Preddy [1996] AC 815, 841; Robb Evans of Robb Evans & Associates v European Bank Limited 
[2004] NSWCA 82, at [138]. 
15 Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson, n 5 above, 286. 
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In order to be able successfully to trace property it is necessary for the 
claimant, firstly, to identify property of his, which has been unlawfully 
taken from him (“a proprietary base”); secondly, that that property has 
been used to acquire some other new identifiable property. The new 
property may then have been used to acquire another identifiable asset 
(“a series of transactional links”). Thirdly the chain of substitutes must 
be unbroken.16 
 
So, in order to trace it is thought that a claimant may either demonstrate that 
some right held by or for him can be linked transactionally with the right into which 
he seeks to trace, or he can point to a series of such links, forming an uninterrupted 
chain:17 
Example (iii): A transfers £1000 to C’s account, from which C pays B 
£1000. 
 
Here, A traces by linking his account with C’s account, and C’s account with B’s. It is 
considered crucial that it is the precise account into which the sum traced is paid that 
is employed in the subsequent transfer. The facts of the following example are, for 
example, thought to be incapable of supporting an attempt to trace from A’s account 
to C’s: 
Example (iv): A transfers £1000 to C’s account. As a result, C pays B 
£1000 from a different account. 
 
The Court of Appeal has recently reiterated the view that it is not enough for A to 
demonstrate that A and C anticipated that C’s payment to B would be made as a result 
of A’s payment to C, if as a matter of fact the provenance of the former was an 
account different from that credited as a result of A’s payment instruction.18  
                                                          
16 OJSC OIL Co Yugraneft v Abramovich [2008] EWHC 2613 (Comm), at [349]. 
17 ibid. 
18 Relfo v Varsani, n 3 above.  
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Yet, the growing complexity of modern payment mechanisms has rendered the 
burden of proving an unbroken chain of the kind depicted by Example (iii) 
increasingly onerous for a claimant to discharge, not least because a fraudulent 
fiduciary is unlikely to be forthcoming in their evidence as to the path of misdirected 
funds.19 On occasion, therefore, judges have cited ‘considerations of justice and 
practicality’ in departing from received orthodoxy to produce a result less jarring to 
lay perceptions of right and wrong.20 The effect is to produce a climate in which the 
content of the pertinent principles, and the effect of their application to the facts of a 
particular case, are exceedingly difficult to predict. The purpose of this section is to 
exemplify some of the problems that arise in attempting to trace from one right to 
another, and to give a brief description of the framework created by existing judicial 
and academic solutions.  
 
Multiple accounts 
 
A fraudster will invariably seek to obfuscate the path of funds misappropriated, so 
that few claimants in the decided cases have been able to document the precise steps 
by which payment from the account originally debited was effected. Giving judgment 
for the Privy Council in Brazil v Durant, Lord Toulson recently acknowledged that 
the process of establishing the requisite link between funds misappropriated and the 
acquisition of some new asset is likely to ‘depend on inference from the proved 
facts’.21 Yet, despite the relative ubiquity of cases in which that inference is drawn, 
                                                          
19 Brazil v Durant [2015] UKPC 35, at [40].   
20 ibid at [13]. See below n 60-64. 
21 ibid at [40]. 
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we have neither a clear exposition of the factors relevant to it, nor of any hierarchy 
between them. 
In El-Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings the claimant was one of many victims of a 
major share fraud carried out in Amsterdam by three Canadians between 1984 and 
1985.22 It had substantial funds and securities deposited with the First National Bank 
of Chicago in Geneva which were under the control of an investment manager. The 
manager misappropriated those funds, investing them in shares traded by two Dutch 
companies. Each time a sum was received by those companies, a corresponding 
amount was deducted from that account and credited to two accounts in Geneva. The 
fraudsters created three Panamanian companies in order to receive their individual 
shares in the profits. Those funds were then transferred into three more Panamanian 
companies, and then again into accounts in London, after which they were invested in 
a joint venture to carry out a property development project in Battersea in conjunction 
with the first defendant, Dollar Land Holdings plc (‘DLH’). DLH argued that the 
claimant had not established that the money in the Geneva account used to secure an 
advance to finance the project represented the proceeds of the fraud remitted from 
Gibraltar to Panama.  
At first instance Millett J held that although the claimant was ‘unable by direct 
evidence’ to demonstrate that the money received into Geneva account represented 
money sent to Panama, the evidence that had been adduced was ‘sufficient, though 
only just, to enable the inference to be drawn’.23 One of the two sums received into 
the Geneva account was almost exactly the same as that sent from the Gibraltar 
account to the Panama account, and there was no evidence that the fraudsters had any 
                                                          
22 El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings, n 5 above. 
23 ibid, 713 (Millett J). 
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significant sum available to them that did not represent proceeds of the fraud. In the 
judge’s words, ‘It is not much, but it is something; and there is nothing in the opposite 
scale’.24  
Two decades after that decision, little advance has been made towards an 
articulation of circumstances relevant to the determination of such an inference. 
Considering the nature of the tracing exercise in a case involving multiple accounts, 
the Court of Appeal has recently concluded that each case is to be decided by 
reference to an open-ended list of factors, absent, it would appear, any shared logic.  
 Relfo v Varsani concerned a claim brought by the liquidator of Relfo Ltd 
(‘Relfo’) against Mr Varsani to recover $878,479.35 that had been misappropriated by 
its former director, Mr Gorecia.25 Mr Gorecia, in breach of fiduciary duty, caused 
Relfo to pay $890,050 to a company called Mirren Ltd (‘Mirren’). The next day, 
another company, Intertrade Group LLC (‘Intertrade’), paid $878,479.35 to Mr 
Varsani’s bank account. Despite the fact that the court had ‘insufficient evidence to be 
able to map each step in the process’– in particular Relfo could not point to specific 
transactions passing between the Mirren and Intertrade accounts to show how the 
Relfo/Mirren payment was translated into the Intertrade payment which went to 
Varsani’s account – Sales J held, at first instance, that the payments were so closely 
linked in time and amount that:  
 
[I]t is a fair inference that the Intertrade payment was the product of a 
series of transactions between a number of entities and across a 
number of bank accounts designed to produce the result that funds 
paid in the Relfo/Mirren payment were (subject to the 1.3% deduction) 
paid on to Bhimji Varsani.26 
                                                          
24 ibid. 
25 Relfo v Varsani, n 3 above. 
26 Relfo v Varsani [2012] EWHC 2168 at [77]. 
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Although it seems manifest that the judge’s inference was guided by the 
intention of the transacting parties, on appeal Varsani argued that this approach was 
incorrect: irrespective of evidence as to the parties’ intention, ‘It must still be shown 
by evidence or inference that there is a direct chain of substitutions whereby the 
claimant’s property was exchanged for another asset’.27  
Adopting a similar position, Arden LJ concluded that the decision at first 
instance could only be explained on the basis that intention was not a ‘major part of 
the evidence on which the judge based his inference’.28 Instead, in any case involving 
multiple payments, ‘what matters is that there has been an exchange of the value of 
the claimant’s property into the next product for which it is substituted and so on 
down the chain of substitutions.’29 Her Ladyship concluded that in the instant case the 
chain of substitutions could be established by reference to ‘basket of factors’, 
including, inter alia: prior dealings between the parties; access to potential money-
laundering vehicles; the amount and timing of payments; and the lack of any 
satisfactory account of the transactions from the relevant witnesses.30  
Yet, if it is not to establish the presence of a scheme designed to bring about a 
debit to one account and credit to another, it is not clear why such factors should be 
relevant,31 and what other factors might, in a different case, enable the inference to be 
drawn. It is, therefore, difficult to predict the outcome of the tracing exercise in any 
                                                          
27 Relfo v Varsani, n 3 above at [32]. 
28 ibid at [58]. 
29 ibid at [60]. 
30 ibid at [58]. 
31 This is discussed further below, in the text accompanying n 94-106. 
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case involving a network of payments, even where such payments are manifestly 
linked by some overall design.   
 
Clearing 
 
In England and Wales the rigidity of the orthodox approach to tracing has preserved 
an ambivalence in the application of so-called ‘common law’ and ‘equitable’ 
principles of tracing to the context of clearing: for so long as that duality persists, the 
former, but not the latter, is thought to be confounded by inter-bank payment 
instructions.  
Agip v Jackson concerned a payment order that had been fraudulently altered 
to name Baker Oil as beneficiary. That order was executed by the claimant’s bank, 
Banque du Sud, which debited their account with $518,822.92 and instructed Baker 
Oil’s bank (Lloyds Bank) to credit Baker Oil’s account in London with the same sum, 
giving instructions to its correspondent bank in New York to reimburse Lloyds Bank. 
Lloyds Bank acted on those instructions. At the third defendant’s behest, it then 
transferred the sum to the account of the defendants’ firm with the bank.  
Millett J held that the claimants were unable to trace at common law for two 
reasons, one of which was that the source of the payment could not be identified 
without going through the New York clearing system, ‘where it must have been 
mixed with other money’.32  
References to mixtures in the context of clearing are confusing. A ‘mixed 
fund’ ordinarily refers to a right that can be attributed to several sources;33 in Relfo v 
Varsani the judge at first instance held that tracing at common law was not possible 
                                                          
32 Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson, n 5 above, 286. 
33 Foskett v McKeown, n 1 above. 
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where the intermediate accounts were not ring-fenced,34 the inevitability of multiple 
debits and credits precluding any possibility of demonstrating that the account at each 
stage was in whole or part the product of a right representing the misappropriated 
funds.  
Clearing does not create this kind of problem, but rather one of identifying the 
chain of payment instructions by which a debit and credit are linked, and a payment 
thereby executed. Importantly, settlement and clearing are not identical: clearing is 
the process of exchanging payment orders between participating banks,35 whilst 
settlement is payment between the banks in settlement of their obligations inter se.36   
Take the following example: 
Example (v): A instructs Bank A to pay B, which Bank A does by 
instructing Bank B to credit B’s account. 
 
In Smith’s words, tracing through the steps of payment, ‘does not require that when 
Bank A paid £400 to Bank B it was the same £400 A paid to Bank A, or even that it 
was its traceable proceeds. It would not matter if Bank A settled with Bank B by 
giving it £400 worth of kiwi fruit’.37 The rights of the banks inter se are not the focus 
of the tracing exercise. Rather, the problem that clearing supposedly creates for the 
idea that we are tracing value through a series of exchanges is the necessity of 
identifying the precise series of payment orders that link A’s right to B’s: if Bank A 
incurs a liability to Bank B in order that B should acquire a claim against Bank B, the 
orthodox approach to the tracing exercise is to connect A’s account to B’s by 
                                                          
34 Relfo v Varsani, n 25 above at [75] (Sales J). 
35 P. Ellinger, E. Lomnicka and C. Hare, Ellinger's Modern Banking Law (5th ed, Oxford: OUP, 2011) 
562 
36 ibid. See also Hare, n 2 above, 257. 
37 Smith, n 10 above, 255. 
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identifying a continuous chain of valuable assets (A’s claim against Bank A; Bank 
B’s claim against Bank A; B’s claim against Bank B). 
A pragmatic approach to bank payments has permitted instances of clearing to 
be dealt with more straightforwardly by the Hong Kong courts. In Kwai Hung Realty 
Co Ltd v Yip Fung Sheung the defendants sought to argue that it was impossible to 
connect two rights once the facts involved any kind of clearing – of a cheque or 
electronic payment.38 The judge in the Hong Kong High Court addressed this with the 
words: ‘The point is after all a simple one, namely whether the money received by 
Wing Lung under each cheque of the plaintiff is the money from the plaintiff and of 
the plaintiff. Any layman would have no hesitation in saying yes’.39 
Yet, Millett J’s views on the clearing of electronic payments have been 
approved in several cases in the UK,40 Canada,41 Singapore,42 and New Zealand.43 
This creates doubt about the ability of claimants to trace in cases involving other 
common payments mechanisms that use some form of clearing, such as debit and 
credit cards.44  
 
                                                          
38 Kwai Hung Realty Co Ltd v Yip Fung Sheung, n 1 above. 
39 ibid. 
40 El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings, n 5 above, 712; Bank Tejarat v Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corp (CI) Ltd, n 5 above, 245; Bank of America v Arnell [1999] Lloyd's Rep Bank 399, 405; London 
Allied Holdings v Lee, n 5 above at [89], [256]. 
41 Citadel General Assurance Co v Lloyds Bank Canada, n 5 above at [57]; BMP Global Distribution 
Inc v Bank of Nova Scotia, n 4 above at [78] 
42 Sumitomo Bank Ltd v Thahir Kartika Ratna [1992] 3 SLR 638, at [186]. 
43 Nimmo v Westpac Banking Corp, n 5 above 238; Equiticorp Industries Group Ltd v The Crown (No 
47), n 5 above, 698-699. 
44 Hare, n 2 above, 256. 
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Credit 
 
The interposition of a period of indebtedness poses the most obvious problem for a 
claimant seeking to establish a continuous chain of valuable assets. Various judicial 
and academic approaches have been taken to the reconciliation of tracing principles 
with debt, and courts have demonstrated neither nuance nor consistency in explaining 
the effects of different manifestations of credit in payment.  
In order to understand the lack of consensus in approaches to debt, it is first 
important to distinguish: (i) problems of claiming from (ii) problems that might exist 
in establishing a continuous chain of valuable assets, and each of (i) and (ii) from (iii) 
problems that might exist in the process of demonstrating a transactional link. 
In the following example, although B can point to the transactional product of 
the original trust right, a claim to that right is valueless: 
Example (vi): T holds title to a £10 note on trust for B. T uses that 
note to purchase a bottle of wine. He drinks the wine.  
 
 The practical importance of this problem is clear: in Re Registered Securities Ltd, 
Somers J considered that ‘as a matter of logic it seems evident that where a claimant’s 
money is paid into an overdrawn account there is no fund or property to which resort 
can be had.’45  
A different problem is created by the indebtedness of an intermediate 
transacting party:  
                                                          
45 Re Registered Securities Ltd [1991] 1 NZLR 545, 554. It is not strictly accurate to suggest that an 
overdrawn account cannot constitute ‘property’ in the sense of ‘right that can be claimed’: even an 
overdrawn account – understood as a right to demand payment and for so long as its limit is not yet 
reached – remains an asset to which it is possible for another person to assert a claim. Whether such a 
claim is worth asserting depends upon the value of the asset that the claimant is able to reduce into his 
control.  
B 
 15 
Example (vii): A transfers £1000 from his account to C’s account, 
which is overdrawn. C uses that account to transfer £1000 to B’s 
account. 
 
In Re Registered Securities Ltd, Somers J continued: ‘Nor does the position seem 
different when the account is further overdrawn and the additional sum is expended 
on some identifiable property. In such a case it is not possible to show that the 
claimant’s money contributed to the new purchase.’46 Here the problem is thought to 
lie, not in the absence of a valuable asset to claim, nor even in the process of 
demonstrating that a chain of transactions connects the relevant accounts, but rather in 
demonstrating that a continuous chain of value can be pursued to B’s account: the 
intermediate account appears to be a liability, not an asset.47 
The last type of problem goes directly to the proof of the requisite link 
between assets. We know that if the asset that can be linked transactionally with a 
right previously held by or for the claimant is valueless, the claimant cannot transmit 
their claim to some other asset in the hands of the defendant with which he cannot 
demonstrate a transactional link.48 In the following example, therefore, B cannot 
assert a claim to title to the bottle of Cristal:  
Example (viii): T holds title to a £10 note on trust for B. T uses that 
note to purchase a bottle of wine. He drinks the wine. X gives T a 
bottle of Cristal.   
 
Many cases are, however, considerably less straightforward. The fact pattern 
that has provoked most discussion of credit in tracing is the repayment of a debt with 
funds that can be linked transactionally to the claimant. This is typically expressed as 
                                                          
46 ibid. 
47 See e.g. M. Conaglen, ‘Difficulties with Tracing Backwards’ (2011) 127 LQR 432, 448. 
48 Director of the Serious Fraud Office v Lexi Holdings plc [2008] EWCA Crim 1443, [2009] QBD 
376. 
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‘tracing into the payment of debt’,49 or ‘backward tracing’,50 and the particular 
problem that it presents is as follows: if a buyer buys an asset on credit and pays for it 
with the claimant’s money, the seller passes title in return for the promise to pay, and 
releases the debt in return for payment.51 It seems, therefore, that in the following 
example there is no continuous chain of valuable assets: 
Example (ix): B buys a bicycle from C for £10 on credit. A 
subsequently gives B £10, which B uses to meet the debt. 
 
Here, however we look at it, A’s rights have been substituted for the release of an 
obligation, and there is no immediate product of that release. The product of the 
substitution of A’s rights is in C’s hands: C exchanged title to the bicycle for a right to 
£10, and then the right to £10 for £10.  
Some courts have pursued this logic to its conclusion without hesitation. In 
Moffatt v Crawford Heiner used proceeds of trust funds to pay for title to a piano 
previously bought on credit.52 He gave the piano to his wife, and she later gave it to 
her daughter. Lukin J held that title passed on delivery of the piano to Heiner and that 
the trust funds could not be traced in any case involving payment by credit.53 That 
decision was affirmed on appeal.54  
Other courts have, however, insisted upon a case-sensitive approach to 
backward tracing. In Relfo v Varsani, even though the Intertrade payment was in fact 
made prior to the Mirren payment, Arden LJ considered that: ‘in order to trace money 
                                                          
49 L. Smith, ‘Tracing into the Payment of a Debt’ (1995) 54 CLJ 290. 
50 Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd v Homan [1995] Ch 211, 216. 
51 Conaglen, n 47 above, 450.  
52 Moffatt v Crawford [1924] St R Qd 241. 
53 ibid, 245-246. 
54 ibid, 248 (McCawley CJ). 
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into substitutes it is not necessary that the payments should occur in any particular 
order, let alone chronological order.’55 Her Ladyship continued: ‘What the court has 
to do is establish whether the likelihood is that monies could have been paid at any 
relevant point in the chain in exchange for such a promise.’56  
Arden LJ must be correct in her assertion that the problem is not strictly one of 
chronology. Otherwise, if participants to an inter-bank payment happen to credit the 
beneficiary’s account prior to making the relevant debit, tracing – legal or equitable – 
would inevitably be thwarted, a conclusion that is not borne out by the decided 
cases.57 But precisely what her Ladyship intended to be understood by the latter 
statement is not clear. The crux of the matter appears to be the determination of 
whether the parties anticipate that the mechanism by which a particular payment, sale 
or other transaction is to be executed is by two or more steps, involving the exchange 
of an asset for the acquisition of an obligation to pay, and the release of that 
obligation for payment. But precisely whose intention is relevant,58 and which way 
such proof cuts,59 are questions that have not yet found satisfactory resolution.    
In Brazil v Durant the claimants sought to trace the proceeds of a wide-scale 
fraud carried out in the late 1990s in connection with a major public works contract in 
                                                          
55 Relfo v Varsani, n 3 above at [63]. 
56 ibid. 
57 e.g. Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1991] Ch 547. 
58 In Relfo v Varsani (n 3 above at [63]) Arden LJ identified the recipient’s intention as key, by contrast 
with the approach taken by Dillon LJ in Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd v Homan [1995] Ch 
211, 216. 
59 For Conaglen (n 47 above) it proves the absence of a transaction; for Smith (n 49 above) it proves 
that there is a single transaction involving delayed payment.  
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Sao Paulo, Brazil.60 In order to do so they had to show that money paid into an 
account in the name ‘Chanani’ at Safra International Bank in New York could be 
connected with an account in the name of Durant at Deutsche Bank, Jersey. One of 
the issues the Jersey Court of Appeal had to consider was the status of two payments 
made into the Chanani account after the last of the payments out of it.  
After considering the authorities, the court concluded that they did not lead to 
‘binary answers’, so that the Jersey courts ‘should not feel constrained either to adopt 
or reject any particular rules’.61 James McNeill QC said: 
 
[I]n a case such as this where an asset is acquired by making a transfer 
out of an account before trust money is paid into the account, the true 
question is whether the plaintiff can establish a sufficient link between 
the trust money of which he was originally deprived, and the asset 
which has now been acquired.62   
 
 
On the facts, that link was held to be manifest. 
On appeal to the Privy Council, Lord Toulson rejected the claim that the 
interposition of a period of indebtedness of the kind exemplified by Examples (vii) or 
(ix) inevitably thwarted the tracing exercise, concluding that in any such case the 
claimant may still be able to ‘establish a coordination between the depletion of the 
trust fund and the acquisition of the asset which is the subject of the tracing claim, 
looking at the whole transaction, such as to warrant the court attributing the value of 
the interest acquired to the misuse of the trust fund.’63 
                                                          
60 Brazil v Durant, n 19 above. 
 
61 Brazil v Durant [2013] JCA 071 at [62]. 
62 ibid. 
63 Brazil v Durant, n 19 above at [40]. 
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So, all that can be said with confidence is that a period of indebtedness may, 
but – depending upon the facts and, perhaps, the jurisdiction and level of the court – 
will not necessarily, cause the claimant to fail to establish a link between some right 
of which he has been deprived and another acquired by the defendant.  
Since very few payments will involve neither clearing nor credit, and most 
fraudsters will attempt to conceal the path of funds by some transactional contortion, 
the absence of a set of guiding principles is no small problem for clarity and 
consistency in this area of private law. In what remains of this article I argue that in 
order to provide a formula that is conceptually and practically robust, it is necessary 
to discard the conceptual premise of tracing, that there is a way in which we can 
meaningfully follow the path of value from one asset to another. 
 
VALUE 
 
Although there is now a large body of material across the common law world 
applying and analysing the principles discussed above, there is remarkably little close 
consideration of the question of what ‘value’, in tracing, means. Let us return to 
Example (i): 
T holds title to a £10 note on trust for B. T uses that note to purchase a 
bottle of wine. He does not have B’s authority to do so. 
 
Recall that the way in which this is ordinarily conceptualised is as follows: B follows 
the path of value from title to the note into title to the wine, which allows him to 
transmit his claim to the former to the latter. The questions considered here are: (i) 
what do we mean when we say that value moves and can be located in the exchange 
product of some substituted right; and (ii) is this a helpful way of expressing the 
relationship between two rights or two transacting parties, in order to provide the 
A 
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foundation for some personal or proprietary claim in respect of an asset not formerly 
held by or for the claimant? 
 
Exchange value 
 
In law, the term ‘value’ most often labels a quantitative representation of the 
relationship between two or more commodities, calibrated by a scale expressed in 
monetary units. This is termed ‘market value’ or ‘exchange value’, and it allows us to 
express predictions about the composite effect of supply and demand in a particular 
market at a particular time. We often, therefore, distinguish ‘exchange value’ (a 
prediction about the price a commodity will fetch)64 from ‘realising the exchange 
value’ (the price that it does in fact fetch).  
This brings us to the first sense in which we might say that value ‘moves’ and 
can be traced through a transaction: if T holds title to a £10 note on trust for B and 
buys with that note a bottle of wine, the exchange value of title to the note is 
somehow represented by the current exchange value of title to the wine – whatever 
that may be – so that B can trace and claim the latter.   
Yet, quite how this works, and what exactly we mean by the statement that 
value ‘moves’ from one to the other, is not clear. To take an extreme example, in 
2006, in a story worthy of the Japanese legend of the ‘Straw Millionaire’, a 26 year 
old Canadian man called Kyle MacDonald traded a paperclip, through a series of 14 
trades, for a two-story farmhouse in Kipling, Saskatchewan.65 The cases are clear that 
                                                          
64 See e.g. the discussion of value in Benedetti v Sawiris [2013] UKSC 50, [2013] 3 WLR 351, at [12]-
[34] (Lord Clarke) and [96]-[123] (Lord Reed). Where a quantum meruit for services rendered is 
concerned, the only possible value is predicted value of an equivalent service: the actual (realised) 
value is nothing. 
65 K. MacDonald, One Red Paperclip: Or How an Ordinary Man Achieved His Dream with the Help of 
a Simple Office Supply (Three Rivers Press, 1st ed, 2007). 
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the vast divergence in the respective values of titles to the paperclip and farmhouse is 
no impediment to tracing from one to the other.    
 In Jones v FC Jones Mr Jones made a series of unauthorised transfers from 
his firm’s account to his wife.66 She multiplied that money fivefold by speculating in 
potato futures, before transferring it to a deposit account with R. Raphael & Sons Plc 
(‘Raphaels’). The Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the trustee in bankruptcy’s 
proprietary claim to those (far more valuable) rights against Raphaels, concluding: 
‘There is now ample authority for the proposition that a person who can trace his 
property into its product, provided the product is identifiable as the product of his 
property, may lay legal claim to that property’.67  
In Foskett v McKeown a trustee had misappropriated trust funds, using them to 
pay two out of five premiums of a life insurance policy, before committing suicide.68 
The beneficiaries of the trust were held entitled to claim two fifths of the insurance 
payout, even though the share of the proceeds recovered by the beneficiaries far 
exceeded that of the contributing trust funds.  
The substitute right might equally be worth less than the substituted right. If, 
in Example (i), the bottle of wine is worth £1, B can still identify it as the product of 
the original trust right, and can claim it. In Smith’s words, ‘there are good and bad 
bargains, and the invocation of ‘value’ as the object of the verb ‘to trace’ does not 
entail that an asset must have the same market value as the asset used to acquire it’.69 
Indeed, there is no reason to think that either right need have any exchange value at 
all. 
                                                          
66 Jones v Trustee of FC Jones & Sons [1997] Ch 159. 
67 ibid, 171 (Millett LJ). 
68 Foskett v McKeown, n 1 above. 
69 Smith,  n 10 above, 17. 
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If this is correct, and it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that it is, we are 
no closer to solving our problem: if T, a trustee, misappropriates a £10 note, title to 
which he holds on trust for B, buying with it a bottle of wine worth £100 (or 10p), 
how is it that value can be said to move from one right to the other in order to 
substantiate B’s claim to title to the wine?  
 
 
Wealth: abstracted exchange value 
 
The sum of the immediate exchange value of an individual’s assets, minus that 
individual’s liabilities, produces a net amount that can be expressed as a money sum. 
This is often referred to as ‘wealth’, and it brings us to the second sense in which we 
might say that value ‘moves’ and can be traced through a transaction: if A has title to 
a scooter worth £20, and swaps it with B for title to a bicycle worth £10, the 
cumulative exchange value of the assets in B’s hands is greater than it was prior to the 
transaction, and the cumulative exchange value of the assets in A’s is less, so that £10 
can be said to have ‘moved’ from A to B.  
If this is what we mean when we say that we trace value, there is no particular 
reason to tie it to the notion of an exchange of particular things or rights at all. After 
all, ‘value may be received (and, more importantly, retained) by the defendant in a 
manner causally linked to the claimant without any transactional link between 
them’.70 Accordingly, Evans argues that we ought to free parties seeking to trace from 
the obligation of proving a transactional link.71  
This point is a good one. We cannot have it both ways: when we say that we 
‘trace value’ we are either interested in (i) a transfer of value between individuals, in 
                                                          
70 S. Evans, ‘Rethinking   tracing and the law of restitution’ (1999) 115 LQR 469, 479. 
71 ibid. 
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which case there is no obvious reason to insist upon the presence of an exchange of 
rights; or (ii) the exchange of particular rights, in which case there is no obvious 
reason to insist upon a transfer of wealth between individuals.  
It is abundantly clear, however, that Evans’ solution is not that which has been 
adopted by our authorities. In OJSC OIL Co Yugraneft v Abramovich OJSC Oil 
Company Yugraneft (‘Yugraneft’), which had a participation interest in LLC Oil 
Company Sibneft-Yugra (‘Sibneft-Yugra’), claimed to have been the victim of a 
massive fraud perpetrated by Mr Abramovich, and sought to trace into the proceeds of 
sale of Sibneft to Gazprom on the basis that a part of the (increased) value of the 
shares in Sibneft represented the (decreased) value of its interest in Sibneft-Yugra.72 
The judge held that it could not, saying, ‘At best there is a causal connection between 
the transfer and the increased value… when what is required is a transactional link by 
which a new asset is exchanged for, and acquired with, the old one’.73 So, although 
Abramovich was better off as a result of the breach of trust (and Yugraneft was worse 
off), his rights as a shareholder in Sibneft were not exchanged for Yugraneft’s 
participation interests, which still existed at the time of the claim.74     
By contrast, if the claimant can demonstrate that some right in the defendant’s 
hands is the exchange product of a right originally held by or for the claimant, it is 
neither here nor there that the transaction has made no difference to the defendant’s 
wealth. In Foskett the defendants argued that the claimant could not trace from the 
premiums paid to the policy payout because, ‘Those premiums were not made in 
exchange for anything since they did not increase the value of the policy or policy 
                                                          
72 OJSC OIL Co Yugraneft v Abramovich, n 16 above. 
73 ibid at [365]. 
74 ibid. 
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moneys. The same sum would have been paid out on M’s death whether or not those 
premiums had been paid’.75 Lord Millett dealt with that point swiftly:  
 
[T]he question is one of attribution not causation. The question is not 
whether the same death benefit would have been payable if the last 
premium or last few premiums had not been paid. It is whether the 
death benefit is attributable to all the premiums or only to some of 
them. The answer is that death benefit is attributable to all of them 
because it represents the proceeds of realising the policy, and the 
policy in turn represents the product of all the premiums.76 
 
 
That leaves (ii): when we ‘trace value’ we are not seeking to connect two 
different people by reference to a transfer of wealth, but two different rights. If A 
swaps title to a scooter for title to a bicycle, that B is better off as a result of the 
transaction is irrelevant: tracing simply connects A’s prior title to the scooter with A’s 
new title to the bicycle, and B’s prior title to the bicycle with B’s new title to the 
scooter, which it does on the basis of the exchange, not on the basis of the effect on 
the net worth of either A or B.  
 
Exchange potential 
 
One of the things that the holder of an assignable right can do is exchange it and by 
doing so obtain something in return. This does not tell us what he will receive in 
return: that must be determined by reference to the supply and demand of a particular 
market, in comparison with other assets within it. This will produce the ‘exchange 
value’ of that right. So, ‘exchange potential’ expresses the idea that ‘I can exchange 
this right’, whilst ‘exchange value’ expresses the idea that ‘if I do I will be likely to 
                                                          
75 Foskett v McKeown, n 1 above, 137. 
76 ibid, 137. 
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receive x’. Exchange value is subject to constant change.77 Exchange potential is 
not:78 even onerous assignable rights have exchange potential. 
Control over the exchange potential of a thing is one of the incidents of title to 
it. This is the idea articulated by Hegel’s statement that ‘as full owner of the thing, I 
am owner both of its value and of its use’.79 The ‘ownership’ of value is not, of 
course, ownership in the sense of ‘best title’. Rather, it captures the idea that a person 
with best title to something is in the best position to exploit its exchange potential. 
Penner puts this clearly: ‘the right regarding value which ownership gives us is the 
right to realise, to capture, the exchange value of our property. It is a right to act in a 
certain way, not a right to something that is somehow already there’.80  
This, finally, is what is meant by those who describe tracing as the process of 
following the path of value from one asset to another:  
 
If a £100 banknote is used to buy a painting, then the value inherent in 
ownership of the banknote is traceable into ownership of the painting. 
Ownership of the painting might be, or might become, worth £10 or 
£10,000. This does not change the conclusion that this asset was 
acquired with the other; the seller transferred ownership of the 
painting in exchange for receiving ownership of the banknote. This is 
what is meant by the notion that it is value which is traced from the 
first asset into the second.81 
 
So, if T, a trustee, misappropriates a £10 note, title to which he holds on trust for B, 
buying with it a bottle of wine worth £100, B is thought to be entitled to claim the 
                                                          
77 Benedetti v Sawiris, n 64 above at [105] (Lord Reed). 
78 J. Penner, ‘Value, Property and Unjust Enrichment’ in R. Chambers, J. Penner and C. Mitchell (eds), 
Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford: OUP, 2009) 309.  
79 G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (A. Wood ed, Cambridge: CUP, 1991) s 63. 
80 Penner, n 77 above, 309.  
81 Smith, n 10 above, 16-17. 
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latter because its acquisition is referable to T’s exploitation of the exchange potential 
inherent in title to the note. Of course, the same explanation is applied, as it must be, 
outside the context of title, to cases involving personal rights, so that value-as-
exchange-potential is not a feature of title, but of the capacity for exchange of any 
right, personal or proprietary.82 For Birks, therefore, the ‘key question’ for tracing is 
simply ‘whether the value inherent in the one asset has in whole or in part been used 
to acquire the other’.83  
Yet, because it is a description of what can be done with a right, exchange 
potential cannot actually ‘move’ from one right to another through a substitution any 
more than ‘edible’ can move from an apple to the person that eats it. The continuity 
assumed by tracing terminology simply does not exist. That language can only be 
understood to express – poorly – what we already know, which is that an actor has 
made an exchange of one right for another. The translation of value into exchange 
potential tells us nothing new; certainly, it tells us nothing about the way in which we 
might prove that such an exchange has indeed taken place.  
In what follows it is argued that concepts of value are not only theoretically 
but also practically misleading: at the root of the difficulties that courts have faced in 
attempting to extrapolate from examples such as Example (i) to more complex cases 
is the failure to recognise that the process of establishing a transactional link is guided 
centrally by the intention of the transacting parties.  
 
                                                          
82 R. Chambers, ‘Tracing and Unjust Enrichment’ in J. Neyer, M. McInnes and S. Pitel (eds), 
Understanding Unjust Enrichment (Oxford: OUP, 2004) 265; 278. 
83 P. Birks, ‘Overview: Tracing, Claiming and Defences’ in Peter Birks (ed), Laundering and Tracing 
(Oxford: OUP, 1995) 289.  
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TRANSACTIONS 
 
 
The language of ‘transaction’ and ‘transactional link’ is commonplace in tracing 
discourse. However, because we have insisted that the way in which we link two 
assets is by following a continuous stream of value from one to another, we have 
assumed both that this exercise can be conducted without reference to the parties’ 
intentions, and that the proof of such a link must involve mapping each step by which 
a transaction is executed. It follows that if we cannot produce such a list, or if 
producing such a list reveals a period of time in which there is no asset in existence, 
we cannot trace.  
In what follows it is argued that this approach to the process of demonstrating 
a transactional link is incorrect. The existence and content of a transaction cannot be 
determined without reference to the intentions of the parties to it. And if those 
intentions reveal that multiple transactions are intended to operate together to achieve 
a particular outcome, the intermediate steps are ignored. This allows us to deal much 
more straightforwardly with instances of multiple payment instructions and periods of 
indebtedness. 
 
Transactions and intention 
 
Although we use the term ‘transaction’ often, it is not easily defined without reference 
to a particular context. The etymology of the term does not help us to narrow its 
conceptual limits. Transaction comes from the Latin ‘transigere’. ‘Trans’ means 
‘across or through’ and ‘agere’, which also takes the form ‘actus’, means ‘to do, 
drive, lead, or pass time’.84 The only idea that appears in each use of ‘transaction’ is, 
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accordingly, that there is some element of bilaterality of action or effect. So, 
‘transactional analysis’ is an approach to psychological theory that developed from a 
study of human interaction by reference to individual developmental history; in 
computer science, ‘transaction processing’ is the unification of a sequence of 
information exchange.  
‘Transaction’ in law contains this element of reciprocity, although it is not 
reciprocity of action or intention, but of legal effect. It is, as a consequence, broader 
than contract, which is our paradigm bilateral transaction: a gift is a transaction. If A 
gives B a bicycle there is an act – the physical movement by A of the bicycle – but 
there is also a ‘transaction’, because that act is both intended to and does change both 
parties’ positions in law. Importantly, that change in the parties’ rights and obligations 
arises out of the intention to change them: a car crash is not a transaction, nor does it 
become one if the driver intends to bring about the crash. This is so because the 
liability that arises from the wrong does not depend on the intention to create it.85 So, 
a legal transaction is the performance of an act that is intended to and does in fact 
change the legal rights and obligations of two or more persons, precisely because that 
is what is intended. 
 
Characterising transactions 
 
The ordinary approach to the characterisation of transactions is to look to the 
transactors’ intentions to determine the content and type of transaction that they have 
created, deduced from consideration of the transaction as a whole. If this intention 
reveals that the parties intended several steps to operate as one, overarching, 
transaction, the intermediate steps are typically ignored. 
                                                          
85 J. Hage, What is a Legal Transaction? 
(<www.academia.edu/471098/What_is_a_Legal_Transaction>  accessed 14 April 2014). 
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In In re George Inglefield a furnishing company went into liquidation. A large 
proportion of its business consisted in letting out furniture on hire-purchase 
agreements, which it financed by virtue of a number of agreements with a discount 
company. At first instance Eve J held that these agreements amounted to a charge 
upon the future instalments payable under the hire-purchase agreement, which was 
void for non-registration. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision, holding that the 
agreements were ‘out-and-out’ sales. Lord Hanworth MR explained that the 
appropriate approach to characterisation was to ‘see what are the rights and 
obligations of the parties to be derived from the consideration of the whole 
agreement’ in order ‘ascertain the substance of the transaction’.86  
In Curtain Dream plc v Churchill Merchanting Ltd Curtain Dream plc agreed 
to sell fabric under a finance agreement to a finance company (‘CML’) and to enter 
into a separate ‘trading agreement’ by which CML purported to resell the fabric to 
Curtain Dream plc, on terms reserving title in the fabric to CML. Knox J held that 
there was an ‘indissoluble link between the various parts of the transaction’,87 so that 
it had to be regarded as a whole, and not as a series of independent transactions.88 
Viewed in this way, its effect was to produce an ‘exact degree of mutuality’ with 
regard to the passing of the title, conclusively indicative of a mortgage or charge.89  
We take precisely the same approach in land law in order to determine 
whether the parties to a lease or licence have created the agreement indicated by the 
chosen label. In Antoniades v Villiers the landlord granted partners the right to occupy 
                                                          
86 In Re George Inglefield Ltd [1933] Ch 1, 19 (Lord Hanworth MR). 
87 Curtain Dream plc v Churchill Merchanting Ltd [1990] BCC 341, 348. 
88 ibid, 352. 
89 ibid, 351. 
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a small flat by separate but identical agreements, entered into contemporaneously.90 
The agreements were expressed to be ‘licenses’ and expressly stated that exclusive 
possession was not granted, and that the use of the rooms was ‘in common with the 
licensor and such other licensees or invitees as [he] may permit from time to time to 
use the said rooms’. The House of Lords unanimously held that the two agreements 
were interdependent and must be read together because, ‘There is an air of total 
unreality about these documents read as separate and individual licenses in the light of 
the circumstance that the appellants were together seeking a flat as a quasi-
matrimonial home’.91 
In tax law, individual transactions that appear to create a particular balance-
sheet result, but which are designed to work as part of a network of transactions, will 
often be disregarded when the court determines the tax consequences of the wider 
transaction. In Ramsay v IRC the taxpayer company entered into a scheme known as 
the ‘capital loss scheme’ that was designed to create artificial capital losses on share 
transactions for the sole purpose of reducing the amount of the capital gains tax 
payable.92 Lord Wilberforce said: 
 
It is the task of the court to ascertain the legal nature of any 
transactions to which it is sought to attach a tax or a tax consequence 
and if that emerges from a series or a combination of transactions, 
intended to operate as such, it is that series or combination which may 
be regarded.93 
 
 
Concluding that it would be ‘quite wrong, and a faulty analysis, to pick out, and stop 
at, the one step in the combination which produced the loss, that being entirely 
                                                          
90 AG Securities v Vaughan; Antoniades v Villiers [1988] 3 WLR 1205. 
91 ibid, 467-8. 
92 Ramsay v IRC [1982] AC 300 . 
93 ibid, 323. 
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dependent upon, and merely, a reflection of the gain’,94 the House of Lords held that, 
viewed as a whole, the transaction produced neither gain nor loss.  
So, in order to determine the existence, content and type of transaction the 
parties have created, the court will have reference to their intention, deduced from the 
agreement as a whole. If this intention, so deduced, reveals that several transactions 
are interdependent, the intermediate steps will be ignored in determining their overall 
effect.   
 
Tracing  
 
 
The orthodox treatment of transactions in tracing bears little resemblance to the 
process just described. We saw above that the Court of Appeal in Relfo v Varsani 
adopted the position that, independently of intention, it could and must be 
demonstrated by evidence or inference ‘that there is a direct chain of substitutions 
whereby the claimant’s property was exchanged for another asset’.95 In other words, 
in the same way that we might show that a particular £10 note has made its way from 
A to B via an intermediary,96 in order to trace we must demonstrate that value once 
located within a particular account has moved from its first repository to another, and 
so on down the chain of substitutions.97 In that case factors contributing to such proof 
included ‘the prior dealings between Mr Gorecia and the Varsani family, the prior 
dealings between Mr Gorecia and Ukrainian businessmen and between Mirren and 
Intertrade and the transactions between their accounts’.98  
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In the first part of this article I argued that references to the movement of 
value are an unhelpful way of expressing the process of identifying the product of a 
rights exchange. Here I show that it is always the executed intention of the parties that 
governs identification of a transactional link – rights exchange or otherwise – and that 
recognising this allows us to overcome the obstacles apparently created by instances 
of multiple intermediate accounts, clearing and credit.  
In order to explain the process of tracing through bank transfers by reference 
to concepts of value, Smith uses the label ‘tracing in transit’, which he exemplifies as 
follows:  
 
Example (x): A has a llama and he wants to give B a cow. C has a 
cow and wants a llama. So, A agrees with C that A will give the llama 
to C and C will give the cow to B.  
 
Smith’s analysis is this: ‘A’s bargain with C is that A will give the llama to C, and in 
exchange C will give the cow to B. Thus, A never sees the cow; he gives the llama to 
C, who gives the cow to B’.99 He continues, ‘if we were concerned with the value 
inherent in ownership of the llama, we could trace it through the substitution into the 
cow, and then follow the cow to B’.100  
Smith extrapolates from this example to that of a bank transfer:  
Example (xi): A instructs his bank, C, to transfer £400 to B.  
 
Here, ‘The reason that the money received by B is traceably the money paid by A [is 
that] A ‘bought’ a payment from C; and this payment is the traceable proceeds of the 
value used to buy it’.101  
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Yet, in neither example is it possible to prove, without reference to the 
intention of the parties, that the transactional product of A’s right is in B’s hands. In 
the first example, the reason that we know that title to the cow is connected to title to 
the llama – prior to or after its physical movement from C to B – is that A and C 
agreed that B should receive the former in return for C’s acquisition of the latter. If, 
like Smith, we attempt to reconfigure the facts as an example of tracing plus tracking 
the movement of a physical asset – the cow – from A to B, we are simply using 
principles of following to express what we already know, which is that the right that 
B acquires to the cow is the transactional product of the right to the llama that A gave 
up.  
In Example (xi) the pretence that we are simply following an asset from A’s 
hands to B’s instantly collapses. A bank payment involves at its most basic the 
execution of a payment instruction to debit one account and credit another. In such a 
case, nothing moves from A to B. Rather: 
 
When a sum of money leaves A’s account his chose in action quoad 
that sum is extinguished. When an equivalent sum is transferred to B's 
account there is created in B a fresh chose in action being the right to 
demand payment of that sum from his bank.102  
 
So, the most that we can say about the effect of the payment instruction in Example 
(xi) is that A loses a claim and B acquires one. B’s right is a new right, to which A 
never had a claim. The way in which we connect that new right to A’s prior claim is 
by reference to the payment instruction – accepted and acted upon by the bank – by 
which A’s intention is revealed.  
The same approach is apposite irrespective of the complexity of the facts. If 
several steps are designed to bring about a single payment, it is that overall payment 
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that forms the heart of the transactional link between A and B. For the purposes of 
establishing a transactional link between the accounts, the following example is thus 
identical to Example (xi): 
Example (v): A instructs Bank A to pay B, which Bank A does by 
instructing Bank B to credit B’s account. 
 
It is for this reason that the interposition of clearing is no problem at all for tracing: in 
order to establish a transactional link in any case involving a bank payment, the 
claimant must show that the parties involved in the transaction intended to, and did in 
fact, bring about a debit to the account held by or for the claimant, and that into which 
the claimant seeks to trace. The precise mechanisms by which inter-bank payment 
instructions are executed by the participating banks have no bearing on the execution 
of this process.  
We are now able to see the fallacy in approaches to the following examples: 
Example (iii): A transfers £1000 to C’s account, from which C pays B 
£1000. 
 
Example (iv): A transfers £1000 to C’s account. As a result, C pays B 
£1000 from a different account. 
 
The orthodox conclusion is that A can establish a transactional link between his 
account and that of B in Example (iii) but not in Example (iv).  In fact, whether this 
is so depends entirely upon whether A can establish that the transaction was designed 
to bring about a debit to his account and a credit to B’s account – a payment, through 
an intermediary, from A to B. That the same account was used to execute each step in 
Example (iii) might be evidence pointing towards such a conclusion, but it is not 
itself conclusive; by contrast, the fact that a different account was employed in 
Example (iv) is neither here nor there, if it is manifest that the intermediate step was 
simply the mechanism for payment from A’s account to B’s.  
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The same will be true where the intermediate account is overdrawn: 
Example (vii): A transfers £1000 from his account to C’s account, 
which is overdrawn. C uses that account to transfer £1000 to B’s 
account. 
 
Here, any problem that might lie in connecting A’s account to B’s goes, not to 
establishing a continuous stream of value, but rather to intention. The proof of a 
transactional link in Examples (iii), (iv) or (vii) requires the claimant to demonstrate 
that the second transfer is not merely a consequence of the first, but rather occurs – as 
in Relfo v Varsani – as part of some overall design.  
It remains only to deal with those cases which have typically been thought to 
engage the process known as ‘backward tracing’: 
Example (ix): B buys a bicycle from C for £10 on credit. B steals a 
£10 note from A and uses it to meet the debt. 
 
 
According to Conaglen regarding a right bought with a debt that is later repaid with 
the claimant’s right as the product of that right ‘ignores the legal mechanism’ by 
which the asset was acquired.103 But it ought by now to be clear that ignoring the legal 
mechanism is precisely the process in which the courts, in characterising a particular 
transaction, ought to be engaged. The question is always: is there a single transaction 
uniting the right claimed and some right formerly held by or for the claimant? The 
interposition of credit, if it forms part of the mechanism for acquisition, does not 
preclude a positive response.  
Although it is by no means the dominant model, some evidence of this 
approach can be detected in the decided cases. In Agricultural Credit Corp. of 
Saskatchewan v Pettyjohn the claimant agreed to loan the defendants money to buy 
                                                          
103 Conaglen, n 47 above, 450. 
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cattle.104 The defendants bought the cattle before the loan was made, using an 
overdraft facility, which the defendants later repaid with funds advanced by the 
claimant. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that that made no difference to the 
establishment of a ‘close and substantial connection’ between the claimant’s funds 
and title to the cattle,105 considering that: 
The appropriate principle of tracing in such a case is that where a set 
of chattels is replaced by another of like function in the affairs of the 
debtor, it shall be open to the court to find that the proceeds from the 
first were used to acquire the second, whatever the formalities of the 
transactions in question.106 
 
The Privy Council recently reinforced this approach in Brazil v Durant, 
holding where the parties anticipate that some onward payment will be reimbursed 
from funds misappropriated from the claimant, the interposition of credit does not 
prevent the claimant from establishing a transactional link. Of the decision in 
Pettyjohn, Lord Toulson said that the court was right ‘not to divide minutely the 
connected steps by which, on any sensible commercial view, the purchase of the cattle 
was financed by the credit corporation, but to look at the transaction overall.’107 His 
Lordship continued: 
The development of increasingly sophisticated and elaborate methods 
of money laundering, often involving a web of credits and debits 
between intermediaries, makes it particularly important that a court 
should not allow a camouflage of interconnected transactions to 
obscure its vision of their true overall purpose and effect. 
 
The treatment of transactions advocated here provides a sound conceptual 
foundation for this statement: in our Example (ix) A must demonstrate that the ‘true 
                                                          
104 Agricultural Credit Corp. of Saskatchewan v Pettyjohn 1991 CarswellSask 172. 
105 ibid, 60 
106 Agricultural Credit Corp. of Saskatchewan v Pettyjohn, n 104 above, emphasis added. 
107 Brazil v Durant, n 19 above at [37]. 
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overall purpose and effect’ of the transaction was to bring about the acquisition of 
title to the bicycle in exchange for title to the note.  
We are now in a position to return, in sum, to the case with which this section 
began; in Relfo v Varsani the Court of Appeal was required, not to identify a 
continuous stream of value providing some non-normative connection between the 
accounts, but simply to show that the parties’ intentions were to bring about the result 
which obtained, that funds were debited from Relfo’s account and credited to 
Varsani’s. Evidence of prior dealings contributed to the likelihood that the series of 
transactions was indeed supposed to operate together to bring about that result. The 
inference drawn in a case such as Relfo thus goes directly to the intention of the 
transacting parties. However the transaction is executed, the tracing question is: is the 
relevant change in legal relations sought and manifested as part of a single scheme? 
Transactions and Claiming 
 
None of what has been said thus far alters the conclusion that the proof of a particular 
kind of connection between two people or two rights does not provide a complete 
explanation for a particular claim. Nevertheless, value metaphors at once complicate 
the process of demonstrating that a single transaction links two rights, and obfuscate 
distinctions of normative importance. The purpose of what remains of this article is to 
demonstrate that several important questions are revealed only when the language of 
tracing is stripped away. 
Importantly, tracking the path of value from one right to another makes the 
following two examples appear, for the purposes of establishing a link between the 
relevant rights, indistinguishable from one another: 
Example (ii): T holds a bank account on trust for B. He transfers 
£1000 from the trust account to C’s account. 
 
B 
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Example (xii): D, a director of P Co, transfers £1000 from P Co’s 
account to C’s account. 
 
Explained through the tracing paradigm, in each example the claimant seeks to 
demonstrate that ‘his’ value, originally located in the account held by (Example (xii)) 
or for (Example (ii)) him is now located in C’s right, in order to transmit his claim 
from one right to the other.  
Without concepts of value and tracing, however, it becomes clear that the 
examples are not the same: in the first, the parties to the transaction are T and C; in 
the second, since D acts as agent for P Co, they are P Co and C. This has important 
ramifications for the justification of any subsequent claim: an action to undo the 
effects of a transaction – however complex – to which the claimant was a party is not 
normatively identical to an action in respect of a transaction entered into by a person 
who has neither the intention nor capacity to change the claimant’s position with 
respect to some third party. Such distinctions must inform any explanation for the 
various remedies that are currently thought to stem in some sense from the 
transmission of claims from rights to their traceable products. 
Only now, with this in mind, is it possible to return to the example with which 
this article began:  
Example (i): T holds title to a £10 note on trust for B. T uses that note 
to purchase a bottle of wine. He does not have B’s authority to do so. 
 
We have already seen that this example has typically attracted the same explanation 
as that applied to Examples (xii) and (ii): B traces the value of his original claim into 
T’s new right. We have also seen that there are irreparable problems with this 
account, so that we have not yet answered the question that framed our discussion of 
value: why is it that B can assert a claim to the title to the bottle of wine?  
 39 
A robust answer to that question requires a great deal of independent analysis, 
which cannot be conducted here. It suffices to conclude simply with the observations 
that: (i) without the language of value and tracing, the substitution by a trustee of a 
right held on trust for the claimant no longer looks theoretically interchangeable with 
the execution of a payment instruction by which some third party account is credited; 
and (ii) since nothing now supports the assumption that an exchange by a fiduciary 
who owes custodial responsibilities to the claimant must be treated in the same way as 
a simple theft and substitution (Example (ix)), it becomes necessary to identify 
whether and if so how the status of T’s initial relationship with B drives or affects the 
claim that arises on the facts of either Example (i) or Example (ii).  
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
It should now be clear that the idea of ‘tracing value’ not only fails to tells us anything 
that we do not already know about the process of identifying a transactional link, but 
actively misleads courts attempting to execute that process. The content of a 
transaction cannot be determined without reference to the intention of the parties, 
deduced from the agreement as a whole. If this process reveals that the parties 
intended several steps to work together, we look not at the precise mechanisms by 
which a change in legal relations is sought, but rather at its overall effect.  
Recognising that nothing in fact flows through the stages of a payment, sale or 
other transaction is important not only for the analytical question – ‘what is tracing?’ 
– but also in identifying the justification for a particular claim. Rather than looking to 
value as a vessel for claims, instead we must identify the normative effect of the proof 
of a transactional link, rights exchange or otherwise. This is no small task, but 
removing the metaphorical premises of tracing ought to provoke more fruitful 
A 
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discussions concerning the explanation for personal and proprietary claims against 
fiduciaries, fraudsters and those who transact with them.  
 
 
Number of words: 10,725 
 
Number of words including footnotes: 12,126 
 
